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Abstract
Directive 1999/92/EC[1] is to be implemented within a year. It requires the
determination of hazardous zones where an explosive atmosphere (ATEX)
may occur. This zoning is expected to be accurate. So is to be the evaluation
of effects associated with an ignition of the so defined ATEX zones. Hence,
Physical phenomena which are involved in the formation of ATEX must be
taken into account and quantified : leak and vaporization of a flammable
liquid, leak of a flammable gas, dispersion of a layer of combustible dust. It
is not recommended to oversize a zone, nor to design a zone having such a
small volume that the effects of an ignition would be negligible.
Introduction
Directive 1999/92/EC defines minimum requirements which every employer
must apply for improving the safety and health protection of his workers
potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres (ATEX).
Every employer shall assess specific risks arising from an ATEX, by
taking into account (article 4) :
the likelihood that an ATEX will occur and its persistence,
the likelihood that ignition sources will be present and become
active and effective,
the installations, substances used, processes, and their possible
interactions,
the extent of the foreseeable effects.
He must classify places where ATEX may occur into zones, on the basis
of the frequency and duration of the ATEX (article 7), in accordance with the
following classification (annex I) :
Zone 0 or 20 : place where an ATEX is present continuously or for
long periods or frequently,
Zone 1 or 21 : place where an ATEX is likely to occur occasionally
in normal operation,
Zone 2 or 22 : place where an ATEX is not likely to occur in normal
operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only.
How to define ATEX zones ?
Effects resulting from an ATEX ignition must be evaluated. These effects
strongly depend on the volume of this ATEX (especially when the volume of
the ATEX is large in caparison with the volume of the containment). Thus it
is important to evaluate as precisely as possible the dimension of each zone
where an ATEX is expected to occur.
To do so, physical phenomena which are involved in the formation of the
ATEX must be understood and quantified.
Evaluation of the volume of ATEX zones
Case of an ATEX generated in free air from a pool of flammable
liquid
Phenomena involved in the generation of an ATEX are the following:
vaporization of the liquid,
mixing of the vapour with air.
The vaporization of the liquid produces a flow of molecules evolving from
the liquid surface ; this flow mainly depends on :
the liquid temperature,
the area of the pool,
the heat transferred from the ground,
and the air movement above the liquid surface.
If the temperature of the liquid is not sufficient, an ATEX cannot be
formed : typically, an ATEX can only occur above a liquid if its temperature
is higher than its flash point.
If the air above the liquid is perfectly calm, the mixing of the vapour with
air is only due to diffusion which is a very slow phenomenon : theoretically,
an equilibrium between liquid and vapour could be reached, producing a
homogeneous ATEX in the whole containment. The ATEX vapour content
relies on the liquid temperature. The larger the volume, the longer the time it
would take to reach such equilibrium.
Actually, equilibrium conditions can hardly be met. Indeed, the air
movement above the liquid (due to forced or natural ventilation) would drag
vapours and dilute them in such a way that no more than an inhomogeneous
ATEX could be formed at the liquid surface.
Mathematical models can calculate the following parameters as a function
of liquid temperature, pool area and air speed above the liquid surface :
the liquid vaporization rate,
the ATEX volume and shape.
Moreover, by taking into account the value of the vapour lower
explosibility limit (LEL), it is possible to calculate the air flow conditions for
which a forced ventilation of the containment is able to :
prevent the presence of any ATEX in the ventilation network,
limit the volume of the ATEX above the liquid surface at such a
level that this place would not be considered hazardous anymore.
Case of an ATEX generated from a leak of flammable gas
Phenomena involved in the generation of an ATEX from a leak of flammable
gas into free air are the following :
discharge of the gas as a jet,
mixing of gas with air.
The mixing of gas with air depends on the nature of the jet : according to
its low or high speed, the jet may be respectively laminar or turbulent.
Jet speed mainly depends on the absolute pressure in the containment out
of which the gas is leaking : if this pressure is higher than 2 bar, the jet is
hypercritic and surely turbulent.
If the jet is laminar, the mixing of gas with air is only due to the diffusion,
which is driven by buoyancy forces depending on the difference between air
and gas densities : a light gas (hydrogen, methane...) will disperse upwards,
while a heavy gas (propane, butane...) will disperse downwards. The
movement of air close to the leak can also influence the dispersion of the gas.
If the jet is turbulent, the mixing of gas with air occurs within the jet itself.
Mathematical models can calculate, as a function of the nature and the
pressure of the gas and of the cross section of the leaking orifice, the
following parameters :
the gas flow,
the distance from the leaking orifice where the LEL is reached on
the jet axis,
the volume of the ATEX
Generally, in process buildings, a flammable gas is fed to equipment
(burner, oven...) by a low pressure pipe network (eg. pressure slightly higher
than atmospheric). Gas leaks must be considered possible. However, if the
network is only made with rigid elements and soldered fittings, the leak
orifice is more likely to have a very small cross section, lower than 1 mm2 (a
leak cross section equals to that of the pipe would correspond to an unlikely
catastrophic rupture of the pipe).
In such a case and if the jet does not impinge any obstacle, the LEL is
reached on the jet axis at a distance less than 20 cm from the leak orifice and
the volume of the ATEX is smaller than 1 dm3.
Moreover, it must be pointed out that this volume remains constant, as
long as the leaking gas is mixed with plain air. Indeed, a mixing with air
progressively enriched with combustible gas would steadily lead to an ATEX
volume increase.
Finally, the volume of an ATEX generated from a slightly pressurised
source discharged into free air through a small orifice is small enough so as
to be considered non-hazardous.
Case of an ATEX generated from a layer of combustible dust
The only phenomenon involved in the generation of an ATEX from the
dispersion of a layer of dust is the blowing of the dust by an air flow. This
flow shall be strong enough to lift the dust and mix it with air.
A very thin layer is able to give rise to a large volume of ATEX : for
example, if the LEL and specific gravity of the dust are supposed to be
40 g/m3 and 1 g/cm3 respectively, a layer having a mean thickness of 1 mm
and covering an area of 1 m2 is sufficient to form an homogeneous ATEX of
25 m3 at LEL.
Then, it appears to be awkward to evaluate precisely the volume of the
ATEX which can be generated by blowing a layer of dust.
Some concerns for the classification of ATEX zones
It is clear that the classification of ATEX zones (or zoning) is an important
stage of the implementation of the Directive 1999/92/EC. Indeed, the extent
of measures to be taken in accordance with the minimum requirements for
improving the safety and health of workers potentially at risk from ATEX is
bound to this classification.
One may think that it is safer when :
a zone is classified at a level higher than the real one (eg zone 1 or
21 instead of 2 or 22, or zone 2 or 22 instead of non-hazardous
place),
or
the volume of a zone is oversized.
On the contrary, some examples show that such a zoning is neither safe
nor recommended.
1s t example : case of a spray booth for powder coating
In the draft standard prEN 12981 : 2000[2], entitled "Coating plants - Spray
booths for application of organic powder coating material - Safety
requirements", the following schematic related to hazardous zones, for an
enclosed recovery system, is given in the figure A2 of normative annex A,













Figure 1 - Powder spray booth with enclosed recovery system
The drawing shows that the whole volume of the spray booth is suggested
to be zone 21.
However, this proposal does not match the definition of zone 21 given in
the Directive.
Indeed, in normal operation, there is a forced ventilation inside the booth
which drags and dilutes unused powder particles : so, it is only in the case of
a ventilation malfunction that there could be an ATEX throughout the cabin.
This failure should lead one to classify the inner volume of the booth as a
zone 22 rather than 21.
Another possibility consists of fitting the booth with a secured ventilation
or with an automatic safety device which switches the powder gun off
whenever ventilation stops. In this case, the inner volume of the booth would
then become a non-hazardous zone.
The decision to classify a place as an hazardous zone 21 or 22 or as a non-
hazardous zone is paramount since the zoning determines "the extent of
measures to be taken in accordance with annex II part A" (ie. minimum
requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers
potentially at risk from ATEX). This particular matter is stated in the
preliminary note of annex I of the Directive.
If the inner volume of the booth is classified as a zone 21 or 22, it means
that, if an ignition source is present, an explosion could occur within it : then,
it would develop an overpressure high enough to produce damaging effects,
not only within the booth itself, but in its surroundings as well. Thus, if
ignition sources cannot be under control, it would be necessary to fit the
booth with a protective device (eg. explosion venting).
Another example would be the conical spaces shaped by the powder
sprays. ATEX are likely to be found within these spaces. Hence, each cone
volume would be entitled for a zone 20 or 21 classification.
But the classification should be decided after having taken into account the
first preliminary note of annex I of the Directive 1999/92/EC, which states
that "a place in which an ATEX is not expected to occur in such quantities as
to require special precautions is deemed to be non-hazardous within the
meaning of this Directive". Hence, the folio whig question has to be
answered : what could be the effects of an ignition of the ATEX contained
within a cone ?
The volume of cones should then be compared with the volume of the
whole booth, in order to evaluate whether the explosion could have a
significant or negligible effect so as to decide if cones should be classified as
a hazardous zone (20 or 21) or a non-hazardous one.
2nd example : case of premises
When combustible dusts, gas or vapours are processed within a premises, one
has to answer what the zoning of this premises has to be. This choice is based
on a thorough study of normal use or malfunctions, leading for instance to
leaks of combustible material into air.
Such a study is likely to split the premises into different zones in regards
with the risk of creating and igniting an ATEX.
However, a rapid assessment could lead to a single excessive zoning
throughout the premises. Such an approach does not meet the Directive
expectations. Indeed, it does not highlight health and safety at work issues.
It only presents a broad pictures that tends to overestimate risks without
pointing out the main concerns for workers.
Such an adverse implementation of the Directive is likely to be seen in
industries where electrical equipment standards were beyond practices in
usual industries. Petroleum industries is an example. In that particular case, it
could be tempting to match zoning with existing electrical equipment
categories. In doing such, one would fail in assessing workers exposure to
potential ATEX.
This unwanted situation could also be seen in places where no or very few
electrical / mechanical equipment are in use. In such places, a rough
assessment could be favoured since it has no or a limited impact on new and
appropriate equipment investment.
Main differences between the control of major-accident hazard
involving dangerous substances Directive 96/82/EC and the
1999/92/EC Directive
The major-accident hazard control Directive 96/82/EC (Seveso directive)
focuses on the environment (people, properties,...) whereas the ATEX one
focuses on workers. Both are concerned with effects of explosions.
A risk assessment carried out within the scope of the Seveso Directive
would consider and evaluate the effects (thermal, overpressure, fragments) of
an explosion on the surrounding of the industrial site. If these effects turned
to be unacceptable, mitigation measures (organisational and technical
barriers) will be amended. Among those, explosion venting of a premises can
be decided so as to control missile effects,... .
Such a conclusion would neither be suitable nor sufficient for an ATEX
Directive approach. Indeed, this measure does not evolve from an health and
safety at work risk assessment : the venting of the premises does not prevent
in any way workers from being injured or killed.
A more appropriate approach in line with the ATEX 1999/92/EC Directive
philosophy would rather lead to the reduction of ATEX volume and therefore
potential damages.
There are real differences between the objectives of the Directive
1999/92/EC and the directive 96/82/EC. Employers must not be mistaken.
Implementing the first one does not mean that expectations of the second one
are satisfied. Both approaches have to be implemented.
Conclusion
For implementation of Directive 1999/92/EC, employers have to evaluate
volume of places where ATEX can occur as well as effects triggered by the
ATEX ignition.
In order to perform an evaluation as accurate as possible, it is necessary to
take into account real phenomena which are involved in the generation of
ATEX.
By doing so, it makes it easier to take advantage from the first preliminary
note of annex I of the Directive, which states that "a place in which an ATEX
is not expected to occur in such quantities as to require special precautions is
deemed to be non-hazardous within the meaning of this Directive".
Finally it may not be safe nor appropriate to oversize ATEX zones.
What seems to be safe and relevant consists in :
first, taking prevention measures, in order to minimise or clear
ATEX zones,
then, taking mitigation measures, dedicated to prevent ignition
sources and to protect workers from harmful effects of explosions
occurring in ATEX zones.
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